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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARNOLD MACHINERY COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CLIFFORD A. PRINCE, dba 
PRINCE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
and WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 
INC., a corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARNOLD MACHINERY COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We refer to Westernfs points in the sequence used 
by it, footnoting references to page numbers of West-
ern fs brief. 
The statement of facts, and later references there-
to in the argument of respondent Western, go far beyond 
the record in this case and lose sight of the issue to 
be decided: Was Judge Croft in error in ruling that 
Western's liability on its bond was subject to a one-
year statute of limitation? 
r 
CASE NO, 
14337 
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Western discusses a prior federal court action. 
There is nothing in the record thereon. Some of West-
ern's discussion is factual; some is not. For instance, 
Western1s statement that a federal court action was be-
gun "one day after the one-year termination" is erro-
neous. In order to refute that statement, we too must 
go outside the record and state that the federal court 
action was commenced October 30, 1974, whereas the com-
plaint alleged the furnishing of the last material on 
October 30, 1973. There was an amended complaint dated 
and filed October 31, but the original complaint had 
been filed, and the action had been commenced, the day 
before. The record does not show the reasons Arnold 
seeks recovery against the subcontractor and its sure-
ty, with whom Arnold dealt, instead of against the con-
tractor and its surety, with whom Arnold had no deal-
ings, or against all. All are not necessary parties. 
The issue, however, is not the merits or demerits of the 
federal court action, but whether or not a one-year lim-
itation applies to this action on Western's bond. 
1 
P. 13 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The Relief Sought on Appeal is Appropriate 
Western argues that, because it had sought and ob-
tained dismissal from the case, it should not be bound 
by the decision herein adjudicating the amount the sub-
contractor Prince owed the materialman Arnold. Western 
chose not to remain in the action to litigate the ques-
tion, and should not now be heard to say it is not bound 
by the adjudication.Prince had the incentive to oppose 
the motion for summary judgment and did in fact oppose 
it. The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgments against 
persons derivatively responsible is applicable in the 
3 
case of indemnitors. 
Western reasons that, because there x\ras an amended 
complaint filed after Western was dismissed from the 
case, some new issues were brought in,such as a credit 
memorandum for offsets due Prince. The file shows that 
the only thing done by the amended complaint was to al-
lege that the amount claimed in the original complaint 
had been agreed to by Prince, creating an account stated. 
Western would be bound on either theory of liability. 
2 
P. 10 
3 
46 Am.Jur.-2d Judgments, par. 551 
4 
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Western asserts that the offsets which Arnold had 
recognized were due Prince may have been attributable 
to something other than the Fish Lake project on which 
c 
Western issued the bond. Western can hardly object 
that Prince and it are getting a credit, regardless 
of its source. 
Western argues that Prince's liability on its 
contract with Arnold for attorney's fees incurred by 
Arnold to collect for the material furnished could 
not be imposed upon Western. The authorities on 
7 
such liability of bonding companies are contra. 
Point II 
The Bond Running to Tolman is for the Benefit 
of Tolman and Materialmen 
Western argues that the language of the bond is 
not broad enough to include anyone but Prince as a 
beneficiary, and quotes the language of the bond nam-
8 ing Tolman as the one to whom Western is bound. The 
5 
P. 11 
6 
P. 11 
7 
Dale Benz, Inc., Contractors, v. American Casualty Co. 
(CA9 Ariz) 303 F2d 80. 
National Surety Corp. v. U.S. (CA5 Tex) 327 F2d 254, 
cert den 379 US 819, 13 L ed 2d 30, 85 S Ct 38. 
State ex rel.Grinnell Co. v. E. H. White Co. (Or) 
3 5 6 p 2 d 943. 
H. Richards Oil Co. v W. S. Luckie, Inc. (Tex Civ App) 
391 SW2d 135. 
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whole contract theory of third-party beneficiary lia-
bility is that, whether or not named, the party for 
9 
whose benefit a contract is made may claim thereunder. 
As discussed'under the Statement of Facts, West-
ern assumes that a prior federal court action was 
brought one day after the Miller Act one-year limita-
tion had run. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental 
Casualty Company 219 F.2d 645, quoted extensively here-
after because of its similar fact situation, holds that 
the subcontractor's bondsman is liable to the material-
man if the Miller Act limitation period has barred a 
claim under the Miller Act bond. 
The language of the condition of the bond shows 
that liability to Arnold exists. It is conditioned 
upon three things: (1) performance of the contract 
by Prince, and (2) indemnification of Tolman by Prince, 
and (3) prompt payment of materialmen. Western 
dwells upon the second point, indemnification of Tolman, 
and argues that if Tolman is not liable and therefore 
does not need indemnification, there can be no liabili-
ty to anyone under the bond. That argument ignores 
the other two conditions, and particularly the third 
condition as to prompt payment of materialmen. A con-
tractor is not solely interested in indemnification, 
9 
Deluxe Glass v. Martin 116 U. 144, 208 P.2d 1127,1130 
10 . 
n AT 
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which is the reason that the other two conditions are 
put into the bond. A contractor is interested not on-
ly in protecting himself from claims of materialmen 
but also in having the job completed and paid for so 
that the contractor does not become involved in the 
time and effort required in settling claims, litiga-
tion, attorney's fees, and damage to business reputa-
tion, which necessarily flow from a construction job 
on which subcontractors go broke. 
The fact that the contractor, Tolman, is not a 
party to this action, he not being a necessary party, 
is no indication that Tolman is disinterested in hav-
ing the materialmen paid. 
Western attempts to distinguish DeLuxe Glass v. 
Martin (supra), wherein this court held that, despite 
the fact that the bond did not have a provision there-
in expressly recognizing rights of third party bene-
ficiary materialmen, the third party beneficiary ma-
terialman could sue the bonding company. Western's 
attempted distinction is based upon the premise that 
in DeLuxe the named beneficiary was liable to the ma-
terialmen. That premise is unfounded. In DeLuxe 
11 
P. 17 
-6-
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the court held that the named beneficiary-owner had 
complied with the bonding statute and therefore was 
not liable to-the materialmen. It, nevertheless, 
held that the materialmen, even though not named as 
beneficiaries, had a direct right of action under the 
bond. Western quotes the following language: 
It follows that should the owner be re-
quired to pay the debts in question, the 
surety would be liable under the bond to 
the owner in precisely the amount which it 
is, by judgment below, required to pay the 
creditors. 
Taken in context, this was the alternative holding by 
the court, that i^f the bond had been held to be inade-
quate under the bonding statute, and "viewing the bond 
as a common-law obligation/' the owner-beneficiary was 
liable to the materialmen for not having furnished the 
statutory bond, and the bonding company would never-
theless be liable. In other words, the court in DeLuxe 
was not basing its ruling, that an unnamed third party 
beneficiary of a bond could sue, on any such premise 
that such right is dependent upon the liability of the 
beneficiary to the materialmen. 
Western further argues as a point of distinction 
that "Tolman has no claim against Prince or the Western 
12 
Surety Company." Western does not explain why the 
named beneficiary, Tolnan, could not successfully claim 
12 
P. 17 
-7-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not only under the subcontract with Prince, but also 
under the bond furnished, wherein Prince was the prin-
cipal and Western was the surety, that the material-
man Arnold must be paid as agreed to under the con-
tract and bond. 
In Utah State Building Board v. Walsh Plumbing 
Co. 16 U.2d 249, 399 P.2d 141 the opposite contention 
was being made, that only the unnamed third-party 
beneficiary materialmen could sue and that, if they 
had not claimed in time, the named beneficiary could 
not sue. This court rejected that contention. In 
doing so, it recognized that materialmen could sue 
even though not named in the bond, but that they were 
not the only ones protected. The court also recog-
nized that the bond was given not only "to carry out 
the overall objective of construction and delivering 
a debt-free building," but also to protect material-
men. 
We conclude, from the above, that Arnold, al-
though not named in the bond, is one of the beneficiar-
ies thereof. 
Point III 
Plaintiff's Sole Remedy is Not in the Federal Court 
The ruling of Judge Croft was partially correct, 
wherein he determined that the remedy under the federal 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Miller Act was not an exclusive remedy. 
Under this point, Western continues to argue, and 
cite authority to the effect that, if Tolman is liable 
to Prince's materialman, Prince and his surety, West-
14 
ern, would be liable to Tolman. That is almost axi-
omatic, and we agree. The converse, however, is not 
true, nor is any authority cited, that Western's lia-
bility to Arnold is dependent upon TolmanTs being lia-
ble. As analyzed above, DeLuxe expressly holds to the 
contrary, that the bonding company was liable to the 
materialman even though the named beneficiary was not 
liable to the materialman. 
Arnold has chosen to claim against the bonding 
company of the subcontractor with whom it dealt, rath-
er than against the bonding company of the contractor 
with whom it had no dealings. Another bonding com-
pany's having also agreed to pay materialmen should 
be no defense to Western. The beneficiary of two sepa-
rate agreements to make the same payment should be able 
to sue either or both of the promisors. 
Western cites the New York case of McGrath v. 
American Surety Co. of New York 122 N.E.2d 906, and 
13 
R. 73-75 
14 
Pp. 18-22 
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quotes therefrom, extensively, language wherein the 
court was attempting to determine what the "intention 
of the parties" was in issuing and obtaining a subcon-
tractors' bond.15 The New York court found, as a mat-
ter of fact, that the intention of the contracting 
parties was solely to protect the prime contractor 
from liability under the Miller Act, and ruled that 
the subcontractor's bondsman therefor was not liable 
to a materialman. 
The reasoning of this case was severely criti-
cized in Socony-Vacuum Oil v. Continental Casualty Co. 
219 F.2d 645, 647, 648, 649. There, in a similar 
fact situation, the Second Circuit refused to follow 
McGrath. The court said: 
(2) Professor Corbin in his work on law of 
contracts, 4 Corbin on Contracts, Sections 798-
804, has this to say: "* * the third party has 
an enforcible right if the surety promises in 
the bond, either in express words or by reason-
able implication, to pay money to him. If there 
is such a promissory expression as this, there 
need be no discussion o£ ' intention to benefit'• 
We need not speculate for whose benefit the con-
tract was made, or wonder whether the promisee 
was buying the promise for his own selfish in-
terest or for philanthropic purposes. It is a 
much simpler question: Did the surety promise 
to pay money to the plaintiff?" See also Cor-
bin, "Contractor's Surety Bonds," 38 Yale Law 
Journal 1. This doctrine, we think, has the sup-
port of the great weight of authority. A long 
line of cases cited to such doctrine in 77 A.L.R. 
53 amplifies the cases which Professor Corbin 
15 
P. 19 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
particularly cites. 
We are unable to recognize either the validi-
ty or the relevance of the conclusion of the 
trial judge that the bond was given only for 
the benefit of the prime contractor and not for 
the protection of materialmen. Doubtless the 
prime contractor in requiring a bond of its 
subcontractor sought protection against his own 
liability to materialmen of the subcontractor. 
But this he obtained through a bond requiring 
the payment of the materialmen. Obviously it 
was contemplated that performance under the 
bond would benefit not only the prime contrac-
tor who would thereby be exonerated from lia-
bility to the materialmen thus paid but also 
the materialmen of the subcontractor who were 
thereby to be paid. 
(3) But this aside, we think it was wholly 
irrelevant for the trial judge to speculate as 
to the motives of the parties of the bond. The 
scope of the bond, like any written contract, 
must be determined not by the unexpressed mo-
tive of the parties but rather by the ordinary 
meaning of the words which they used. By this 
simple test, the defendant here was plainly 
obligated to pay nmaterial obligations" such 
as that sued on here. 
The situation is affected not at all by the 
fact that the plaintiff failed to perfect its 
rights under the Miller Act against the prime 
contractor and its surety. The bond now sought 
to reach was not one required under that Act 
and the rights to which it gave rise are not 
qualified by the Act or conditioned upon the 
timely pursuit of remedies under that Act. The 
rights under this bond must be determined by 
its language interpreted as of the date it was 
given. At that time, of course, it was not 
known whether all or some of the materialmen 
would fail or decline to press their rights un-
der the Miller Act. 
Moreover, the bond was conditioned not only on the 
payment of T?material obligations" but also on re-
imoursement to the obligee of "all loss and damage 
which said obligee may sustain by reason of failure 
or default on the part of said Principal." This 
latter branch of the condition was broad enough to 
-11-
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protect the prime contractor against claims 
of materialmen which through timely prosecu-
tion had actually caused loss to the prime 
contractor or his surety. The branch of the 
condition calling for payment of material 
obligations without limitation to those which 
might be timely prosecuted under the Miller 
Act imports an intent that all were to be in-
cluded within the obligation of the bond. 
.••But both the Spokane and the McGrath 
cases and others of similar purport we think 
out of line with the great weight of authori-
ty referred to above. With deference, we sug-
gest that it is unfortunate doctrine to modi-
fy the scope of a plainly stated written obli-
gation in a private bond by the supposed mo-
tive of the obligee, as these cases seem to 
do. Such doctrine leads to unnecessary and 
undesirable uncertainty in business relation-
ships. It means that one within the orbit of 
a private bond cannot rely upon a plainly 
stated obligation; instead he must search 
for the undisclosed motive of the parties and 
take that as the measure of his rights, 
...To say that the object of the bond was 
only to protect the obligee against liabili-
ties imposed upon him by the Miller Act over-
looks the fact that the bond was not required 
by that Act and calls for the payment of "all 
labor and material obligations'" without ex-
press limitation to liabilities of the obligee 
under the Miller Act. In our view, the object 
of the bond was to accomplish the payment of 
these obligations and by such payment to pro-
vide protection to the obligee. If the obli-
gee sought indemnity only or if it wished to 
exclude third parties from benefit under a sure-
ty bond, the natural presumption is that it would 
not have required a surety's payment bond. But 
here the prime contractor required a payment 
bond and paid the premium for a payment bond, 
at least indirectly under the terms of the sub-
contract whereby the subcontractor made the di-
rect payment. And the defendant in return for 
the premium, furnished a payment bond. It fol-
lows that the surety should not be allowed to 
avoid the obligation which it was paid to assume 
by suggesting that as things turned out the obli-
gee did not need all the protection which was 
bargained and paid for. Were we to hold other-
wise, we should in effect, by substituting a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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mere contract for indemnity for the bond which 
was made, be presenting the defendant surety 
company with an unearned windfall. 
This court" in DeLuxe (supra) has shown that it would 
follow Socony instead of McGrath. In DeLuxe this court 
said that it would recognize the right of a materialman 
to recover from the bonding company regardless of the 
MintentM of the contracting parties: 
"It is not always quite clear what is meant 
when the courts say that the Tintention' of 
the parties is controlling. There does not seem 
to be any basis for holding that, although a per-
formance of the contract will necessarily and 
directly benefit the third person, his remedy de-
pends upon an intention on the part of the part-
ies to the contract that he shall have the right 
to sue thereon. While the intention of the part-
ies controls in the creation of rights under the 
contract, and in determining the things required 
by the contract to be done by the parties, it 
would seem that, once the right is created or 
the duty is imposed in favor of the third person, 
the law furnishes the remedy, regardless of the 
intention of the parties in respect thereof. 
rf
* * * So long as the contract necessarily and 
directly benefits the third person, it is immateri-
al that this protection was afforded him, not as 
an end in itself, but for the sole purpose of se-
curing to the promisee some consequent benefit or 
immunity. In short, the motive, purpose, or de-
sire of the parties is a quite different thing 
from their intention. The former is immaterial; 
the intention, as disclosed by the terms of the 
contract, governs. It is to be borne in mind that 
the parties are presumed to intend the consequences 
of a performance of the contract. That which is 
contemplated by the terms of the contract is fin-
tended1 by the parties. fThe distinction between 
the motive which leads a person to enter into a 
contract, and the intention deducible from the 
terms of the contract as it is written, is a very 
clear one. T * * *" (Citing cases). 
(5) Clearly, the bond in this case was "intend-
ed" to directly benefit the materialmen, as that 
expression is above defined. They, therefore, are 
entitled to maintain this action. 
i & 
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Consequently, Arnold's sole remedy is not to bring 
an action in the federal court under the Miller Act. 
Point IV 
One-Year Limitation is Inapplicable 
Western argues that Arnold "... takes the position 
that we here have a bond which is not a bond...and that 
none of the many bond limitations... are of any weight." 
That is not Arnold's position. The position is, rather, 
that none of the particular statutory provisions as to 
particular bonds, relied on by Judge Croft and Western, 
applies to the common-law bond. 
Western attempts to distinguish Rader v. Manufac-
turer's Casualty Insurance Co, of Philadelphia 242 F.2d 
-19, on the ground that the particular bond involved 
18 
xas not a "payment bond." We recognize that there is 
such a distinction, but feel it is a distinction with-
out a difference. The point the case establishes is 
that, if the bond is not of the type required by a par-
ticular statute, a statute of limitations relating to 
commencement of suit under such bond is inapplicable to 
a collateral bond issued in the same transaction, but 
r.ot of the type required^y the statute. 
?. 25 
?. 23 
1 A _ 
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Western argues that Utah decisions recognize the 
similarity between the mechanics1 lien and bond 
19 
statutes and decisions. With this we have no quarrel. 
However, the statutes are not identical and there are 
different requirements for various things including the 
following: A lien claimant must file within 60 to 80 
days after completion of contract under 38-1-7, where-
as no time is provided for filing a claim under a bond 
required by 14-2-1; a lien claimant must sue within 12 
months after completion of contract under 38-1-11, where-
as one claiming for failing to furnish a bond must sue 
within one year from furnishing last material, 14-2-2. 
.The assumption of Western, therefore, that the lien 
and bond statutes are interchangeable cannot be sus-
tained despite the language contained in Carlisle v, 
20 Cox recognizing their similarity. 
Western argues that "all bond statutes contain the 
21 imposition of one-year statutes of limitations." We 
concede that the ones cited by Western contain a one-
year limitation, but each one cited refers to a particu-
lar type of bond and none of them purports to cover 
19 
Pp. 15, 24 
20 
29 U,2d 136, 506 P.2d 60 
21 
P. 24 
1 r 
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"common -law" bonds. This court recognized in DeLuxe 
'supra) that there can be, and are, common-law bonds 
in stating: 
Disregarding the quoted statute and viewing 
the bond as a common law obligation, the 
weight of authority is to the effect that 
under the bond here involved, the circuity 
suggested by what is said in the preceding 
paragraph is not here required; and that 
under such bond the plaintiff and inter-
veners may sue the surety.22 
The rationale used by the court in its decision in 
Deluxe was to consider the bond, there in question, 
first from the point of view of its being a common-
lav; bond and second from the point of view of its 
being a bond required by statute, and reaching the 
sar.e result from both approaches. 
Western quotes 14-2-2 as providing: 
"actions to recover on liabilities shall be 
commenced within one year from the last date 
that the materials were furnished or the la-
bor performed." (emphasis added) 23 
This is a misquote, which undoubtedly was unintention-
al, but it nevertheless reflects the mistaken ration-
ale used by Western. The correct quote of the statute 
"actions to recover on such liability shall 
be commenced within one year from the last 
date that the materials were furnished or 
the labor performed." (emphasis added) 
2.08 P.2d 1127, 1131 
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The correct quote shows that this one-year limitation 
is referring to f,such liabilityn as referred to in the 
chapter. 
Western argues that Oscar E. Chytraus Company,Inc. 
24 
v. Wasatch Furnace and Electric, Inc. applies the one-
year limitation in 14-2-2 to a situation in which there 
was an action on the bond, as distinguished from an ac-
tion for failure to require a bond. We concede that 
the court did so, but feel that, in so doing, the court 
did not consider the distinction we make, that the one-
year limitation by the very terms of the act is appli-
cable to "any persons subject to the provisions of this 
chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good and suffi-
cient bond...n (emphasis added). Such a distinction 
was not discussed in the opinion. We cannot see how 
the statute can be construed as being applicable to a 
situation in which a bond was furnished, when the lan-
guage is otherwise, despite the reasoning in Chytraus. 
The principal reason, however, that we argue that the 
one-year limitation of 14-2-2 does not apply is that 
it relates to a private owner's duty to require the 
contractor to furnish a bond, and not to a federal 
project contractor's voluntarily obtaining a bond. 
24 
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This is further emphasized by the above-quoted lang-
uage of the Act which limits its applicability to 
"any persons subject to the provisions of this chap-
ter.M 
Western argues that Arnold is inconsistent in 
saying on the one hand "that the situation was not 
or.e concerned with federal law... then analysing that 
it was not a state project but rather a federal pro-
25 
;ect." This is a misstatement of our position, 
which is that the work was on a federal project and 
was not,therefore,the type of project in which a bond 
is required of an owner improving his land under a 
private contract. 
Western argues that "if state laws should apply" 
the contractor requiring a bond not required by statute 
should be treated as if he were "the owner," who is 
required by statute to obtain a bond, pursuant to which 
there would be a one-year limitation. This is a non-
secuitur. Each particular state statute involved has 
to be examined to determine whether or not it applies. 
If state law applies, all "state laws" do not. Whether 
2 7 
:r not a particular state law "should apply" must be 
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determined by the language used by the legislature. 
If the legislature intended a limitation of one year 
to apply on all bonds, it would have said so. 
Western argues that the contractor Tolman's re-
quiring the furnishing of a bond by Prince was a "pri-
vate contract" which is "analogous and similar to that 
2 8 
provided for in Section 14-2-1.ff Western then con-
cludes therefrom that, since it is similar to a situ-
ation in which a bond is required and a limitation 
period provided for, the statute should apply. If 
that had been the legislative intent, the legislature 
would not have required an "owner of any interest in 
land" to furnish a bond but would have said "anyone 
entering into a contract," 
Probably the most venerable case ever cited to 
any personnel of this court is Victor Sewing Machine 
Co. v. Crockwell et al 3 U.152,1 P 470 (1882), judg-
ment affirmed Streeper v. Victor Sewing Machine Co. 
112 U.S. 688, 5 S.Ct. 327, 28 L.Ed. 852. This case 
holds that the applicable statute of limitations for 
a bond guaranteeing payment is that applicable to an 
action on a written instrument, which was then four 
years but is now six years. The case has been cited 
with approval and never overruled* 
28 
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CONCLUSION 
Arnold here seeks recovery from the subcontractor 
and its surety, with whom Arnold dealt. Arnold does 
not also seek recovery from the contractor and its sure-
ty with whom Arnold had no dealings. 
Prince agreed to pay the materialman, Arnold, and 
furnished a bond expressly providing that materialmen 
would be paid. Arnold obtained a judgment against 
Prince, and now should be able to hold Prince's surety 
liable for the very thing it expressly obligated itself 
to pay. 
Judge Croft was in error in ruling that Arnold's 
claim against the surety is barred by the one-year stat-
ute of limitations in 14-2-2. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN W. LOWE 
BRAYTON, LOWE § HURLEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
1011 Walker Bank Building' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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